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The Prodigal Father: Intestate Succession of Illegitimate
Children in North Carolina Under Section 29-19
Section 29-19 of the North Carolina General Statutes establishes proce-
dures for a father's legal recognition of his illegitimate child for the purpose of
intestate succession.1 In In re Estate of Stern v. Stern,2 a case of first impres-
sion,3 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that section 29-19 can prevent
the lineal and collateral kindred of an illegitimate child's father from inheriting
from the child's intestate estate if the father failed to acknowledge his paternity
by the statutorily prescribed method.4 In its holding, the court relied on prece-
dent from the United States Supreme Court and on North Carolina courts' in-
terpretation of the statute's language and purpose. A dissent, however,
contended that, based on the facts presented, the court's failure to recognize the
father's constructive compliance with section 29-19 rendered the statute viola-
tive of the equal protection clause.5 Whichever view is technically correct, the
outcome of Stern raises doubts about the fairness of the legislative scheme and
its interpretation by the courts. This Note examines the Stern decision and its
implications, proposes changes in section 29-19, and suggests a change in the
judiciary's construction of the statute to ensure that the legislation will better
serve its stated purpose of equalizing the inheritance rights of legitimate and
illegitimate children.
1. The statute provides:
(a) For purposes of intestate succession, an illegitimate child shall be treated as if he
were the legitimate child of his mother, so that he and his lineal descendants are entitled to
take by, through and from his mother and his other maternal kindred, both descendants
and collaterals, and they are entitled to take from him.
(b) For purposes of intestate succession, an illegitimate child shall be entitled to take
by, through and from:
(1) Any person who has been finally adjudged to be the father of such child pursuant
to the provisions of G.S. 49-1 through 49-9 or the provisions of G.S. 49-14 through 49-16;
(2) Any person who has acknowledged himself during his own lifetime and the child's
lifetime to be the father of such child in a written instrument executed or acknowledged
before a certifying officer named in G.S. 52-10(b) and filed during his own lifetime and the
child's lifetime in the office of the clerk of superior court of the county where either he or
the child resides.
Notwithstanding the above provisions, no person shall be entitled to take hereunder unless
he has given written notice of the basis of his claim to the personal representative of the
putative father within six months after the date of the first publication or posting of the
general notice to creditors.
(c) Any person described under subdivision (b)(1) or (2) above and his lineal and
collateral kin shall be entitled to inherit by, through and from the illegitimate child.
(d) Any person who acknowledges himself to be the father of an illegitimate child in
his duly probated last will shall be deemed to have intended that such child be treated as
expressly provided for in said will or, in the absence of any express provision, the same as a
legitimate child.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19 (1984).
2. 66 N.C. App. 507, 311 S.E.2d 909, aff'dper curiam, 312 N.C. 486, 322 S.E.2d 771 (1984).
3. Id. at 515, 311 S.E.2d at 914 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 512, 311 S.E.2d at 912.
5. Id. at 521-22, 311 S.E.2d at 917 (Johnson, J., dissenting). The equal protection clause
states: "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
PROPERTYLAW
Prior to the passage of section 29-19, illegitimate children had few inheri-
tance rights. Originally, illegitimate children were seen asfilius nullius-unable
to inherit either intestate or through a will. 6 The North Carolina courts later
recognized an illegitimate child as an heir of the mother, entitled to the same
inheritance rights as her legitimate children.7 The 1935 Intestate Succession Act
went further and provided that collateral heirs of a mother could inherit from
her illegitimate child. 8 When the Act was modified in 1959, however, the North
Carolina General Assembly rejected a proposal that would have permitted intes-
tate inheritance by an illegitimate child from the father if paternity was estab-
lished in a court action for nonsupport.9
The current version of section 29-19 is a remedial statute intended to "miti-
gate the hardships" of the common law on inheritance by illegitimates1° and
achieve "insofar as practical" equal inheritance between legitimate and illegiti-
mate children. 11 Statutory provisions requiring that the father legally recognize
his illegitimate child before the child can inherit are intended to strike a balance
between this remedial goal and the state's dual interests in orderly disposition of
estates and prevention of fraudulent claims against the estates of putative fa-
thers.12 While a mother's illegitimate children are treated as legitimate for intes-
tate succession purposes, 13 section 29-19(b) provides that they can "take by,
through and from" 14 their father only if paternity is established in a criminal
6. See Note, Judicial Impairment of the Illegitimate's Paternal Inheritance Rights in North
Carolina-Mitchell v. Freuler, 16 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 205, 205 (1980). See, eg., Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 768 (1977).
7. Paul v. Willoughby, 204 N.C. 796, 798, 169 S.E. 226, 228 (1933). The limited nature of this
modification of the common law is illustrated in Brown v. Holland, 221 N.C. 135, 136, 19 S.E.2d
255, 256 (1942), where the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the term "issue" in a mother's
will only included her legitimate children. The modification also did not allow collateral heirs of the
mother to inherit from the mother's illegitimate child. Carter v. Smith, 209 N.C. 788, 185 S.E. 15
(1936); Board of Educ. v. Johnston, 224 N.C. 86, 29 S.E.2d 126 (1944). In addition, an illegitimate
child could not inherit any property from her mother which the mother had received from the father
of the legitimate children. McCall, North Carolina's New Intestate Succession Act, 39 N.C.L. REv.
1, 13 (1960). See also Battle v. Shore, 197 N.C. 449, 449, 149 S.E. 590, 590 (1929) (mother's illegiti-
mate children inherit as her heirs but father's do not).
8. Board of Educ. v. Johnston, 224 N.C. 86, 88, 29 S.E.2d 126, 127 (1944).
9. McCall, supra note 7, at 14. The general assembly provided full inheritance rights for legit-
imated and adopted children in 1955. Greenlee v. Quinn, 255 N.C. 601, 606, 122 S.E.2d 409, 413
(1961). See also Comment, Illegitimacy in North Carolina, 46 N.C.L. REv. 813, 825 (1968) (adop-
tion laws intended to alleviate stigma of illegitimacy, but only through nonreference to child's pa-
rental status).
10. Mitchell v. Freuler, 297 N.C. 206, 216, 254 S.E.2d 762, 768 (1979); Stern, 66 N.C. App. at
511, 311 S.E.2d at 912 (quoting Mitchell).
11. Mitchell v. Freuler, 297 N.C. 206, 216, 254 S.E.2d 762, 768 (1979); Stern, 66 N.C. App. at
511, 311 S.E.2d at 912 (quoting Mitchell).
12. Mitchell v. Freuler, 297 N.C. 206, 216, 254 S.E.2d 762, 768 (1979); Stern, 66 N.C. App. at
511-12, 311 S.E.2d at 912. See also Note, supra note 6, at 205 (In dealing with unequal treatment of
illegitimate persons, state legislatures must consider countervailing factors such as efficiency in ad-
ministering estates and the policy of discouraging "spurious assertions of paternity."); Note, Illegiti-
macy and Equal Protection, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 479, 511 (1974) ("The state is properly concerned
with minimizing administrative expense and inconvenience, as well as with preventing the successful
assertion of fraudulent claims.").
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19(a) (1984). For text of statute, see supra note 1.
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19(b) (1984). For text of statute, see supra note 1. See also McCall,
supra note 7, at 13-14 (discussion of "by, through and from" language).
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action for nonsupport,' 5 in a civil proceeding for support, i6 or by the father's
ackowledgement of paternity "before a certifying officer ... during his own
lifetime and the child's lifetime."' 17 The statute also provides that a duly ad-
judged or acknowledged father and his heirs may inherit from the illegitimate
child's estate18 and that a father's ackowledgement of his illegitimate child in a
will may be treated as intent to have the illegitimate child inherit as though she
were legitimate. 19
The Stern case arose in this statutory context. Decedent Gordon Stern was
born to Hilda Weiss and Edward D. Stern in Saskatchewan, Canada, where laws
forbidding intermarriage between Jews and Catholics prevented the couple from
marrying. Decedent lived with his parents from birth and continued to live with
his father after his mother's death. He adopted his father's surname to facilitate
inheritance under his father's will and subsequently inherited $500,000 at his
father's death. Although decedent's father had never sought judicial or other
official recognition of his paternity, he had recognized decedent as a son in his
will. Upon decedent's death intestate one year after his father's death, the heirs
of decedent's father sued to share in the decedent's estate. The trial court ruled
that only the mother's heirs were entitled to inherit and plaintiffs appealed. 20
Stern presented the court of appeals with the novel issue of when the heirs
of an illegitimate child's father are entitled to inherit from the illegitimate child
by intestate succession. Plaintiffs first contended that Edward Stern had com-
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19 (b)(1) (1984). For text of statute, see supra note 1. The criminal
nonsupport provisions are found in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 49-1 to -9 (1984). Nonsupport of a child is
a misdemeanor. Id. § 49-2. The trial court has the power to compel both defendant and child to
submit to blood tests. Id. § 49-7. If defendant is convicted, the judge must fix a child support
arrangement. Id.
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19(b)(1) (1984). For text of statute, see supra note I. The civil
proceeding is a paternity action for support under N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 49-14 to -16 (1984). See
Mitchell v. Freuler, 297 N.C. 206, 221 n.2, 254 S.E.2d 762, 763 n.2. The action must be completed
before the putative father's death. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-14(b) (1984).
In addition to blood tests, a broad range of evidence is allowed to prove or disprove paternity in
a civil proceeding. See Wright v. Gann, 27 N.C. App. 45, 217 S.E.2d 761 (1975); Note, The Use of
Blood Tests in Actions to Determine Paternity, 16 WAKE FOREsr L. REv. 591 (1980). A mother's
testimony about the period between sexual intercourse with defendant and the child's birth is admis-
sible. County of Lenoir ex rel. Dudley v. Dawson, 60 N.C. App. 122, 298 S.E.2d 418 (1982); State v.
Snyder, 3 N.C. App. 114, 164 S.E.2d 42 (1968). The child can be exhibited to show resemblance to
the defendant. State v. Green, 55 N.C. App. 255, 284 S.E.2d 688 (1981). Defendant's out of court
admission of paternity is relevant. State v. Bowman, 231 N.C. 51, 55 S.E.2d 789 (1949). Defend-
ant's payments to child's mother are admissible evidence. State v. Garner, 34 N.C. App. 498, 238
S.E.2d 653 (1977). Evidence of a mother's sexual relations with other men near the time of concep-
tion can be offered. State v. Farmer, 63 N.C. App. 384, 304 S.E.2d 765 (1983). For a discussion of
evidence used to prove paternity in intestate proceedings in other states, see infra notes 58-59, 61-63
and 68-70 and accompanying text.
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19(b)(2) (1984). For text of statute, see supra note 1. The father
may voluntarily acknowledge paternity before a certifying officer listed in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-
10(b) (1984). The certifying officer "shall be a notary public, or a justice, judge, magistrate, clerk,
assistant clerk or deputy clerk of the General Court of Justice, or the equivalent or corresponding
officers of the state, territory or foreign country where the acknowledgment is made." Id.
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19(c) (1984). For text of statute, see supra note 1.
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19(d) (1984). For text of statute, see supra note I.
20. Stern, 66 N.C. App. at 507-10, 311 S.E.2d at 909-11. At his death, decedent was a resident
of North Carolina. His parents, however, had never resided in the state. Id. at 508, 311 S.E.2d at
910.
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plied with the paternal acknowledgment requirements of section 29-19 when he
recognized Gordon Stem as his son in his will, thus allowing the son, under
section 29-19(d), to be treated as a legitimate child under the will.21 Section 29-
19(c) explicitly provides that the heirs of an illegitimate child's father are enti-
tled to intestate inheritance from the child under the same circumstances that
the child can inherit from the father-specifically, when the father has recog-
nized the child under section 29-19(b).22 Plaintiffs in Stern did not argue that
Edward Stem had complied directly with section 29-19(b) in acknowledging
Gordon Stem as his illegitimate son.23 Instead, they contended that Edward
Stem's statement of paternity in his will in compliance with section 29-19(d)
constructively satisfied the requirements of section 29-19(b).2 4 Under plaintiffs'
interpretation, Edward Stem's indirect compliance with subsection (b) enabled
them to recover under subsection (c). The Stern court rejected this construction,
holding that section 29-19(d) only enables the illegitimate child to take under the
will from the putative father; it does not allow the father's heirs to inherit from
the child under intestacy.2 5 The court found that Edward Stem had failed to
comply with section 29-19(b) and that his heirs were not entitled to inherit from
Gordon Stem under section 29-19(c). 26
Plaintiffs also contended that failure to grant them inheritance rights would
deny equal protection of the law to fathers of illegitimate children and heirs of
such fathers.27 The court in Stern relied on the denial of equal protection claims
in prior cases to dispose of this argument even though the equal protection prob-
lem in Stern is distinguishable from earlier suits. In one case relied on by the
court, Mitchell v. Freuler,28 the class distinction complained of was between le-
gitimate and illegitimate children. In contrast, plaintiffs in Stern alleged dis-
crimination against the father's heirs in favor of the mother's. 29 The court of
appeals, however, employed the same equal protection analysis in Stern as had
21. Id. at 510, 311 S.E.2d at 911. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19(d). For text of statute, see
supra note 1.
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19(c) (1984). For text of statute, see supra note 1.
23. Stern, 66 N.C. App. at 510, 311 S.E.2d at 911.
24. Id. In his dissent Judge Johnson contended that the presence of a provision for inheritance
under a will in the intestate succession statute rendered its meaning ambiguous in relation to the
other provisions of § 29-19. Therefore, to further the remedial purposes of the statute, Judge John-
son stated that compliance with § 29-19(d) should be interpreted to fulfill the paternal acknowledge-
ment provisions of § 29-19(b). Id. at 519, 311 S.E.2d at 916 (Johnson, J., dissenting). See infra note
46 and accompanying text.
25. Stern, 66 N.C. App. at 510, 311 S.E.2d at 911. According to the majority, "G.S. 29-19(c)
clearly and unambiguously provides that a putative father and his kindred are only entitled to inherit
from an illegitimate child if paternity has been established by one of the methods prescribed in G.S.
29-19(b)." Id.
26. Id.
27. Stern, 66 N.C. App. at 511, 311 S.E.2d at 911.
28. 297 N.C. 206, 254 S.E.2d 762 (1979). In Mitchell an illegitimate child argued that § 29-
19(b) violates the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment by placing the burden of showing
paternal recognition on illegitimate children but not on legitimate children. Id. at 207, 254 S.E.2d at
763. See also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 763 (1977) (illegitimate children as plaintiffs); Lalli
v. Lai, 439 U.S. 259, 262 (1978) (illegitimate children as plaintiffs).
29. Stern, 66 N.C. App. at 510, 311 S.E.2d at 911. In Stern, plaintiffs contended that section
29-19(b) violates the equal protection rights of the illegitimate child's father and paternal heirs by
requiring that paternity be acknowledged in the manner required by the statute before they can
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been used in Mitchell because it found that the statute's purpose-to balance
inheritance rights against the state's interests in preventing fraudulent claims
upon estates-protected it against equal protection challenges whether the chal-
lenges were brought by a father's heirs or by an illegitimate child.30
Once the court of appeals determined that Stern presented the same equal
protection problem as prior cases, United States Supreme Court and North Car-
olina Supreme Court precedent foreclosed plaintiff's contention that section 29-
19(b) on its face violated equal protection. In Trimble v. Gordon31 and LaI v.
Lalli32 the United States Supreme Court established a framework for review of
statutes affecting intestate succession by illegitimate children. The Court ap-
plied the intermediate scrutiny equal protection test and suggested that statutes
which classify illegitimate children's inheritance rights differently from those of
legitimate children may be unconstitutional even if they "'bear some rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose.' ,,33 Thus, a statute that imposes a
substantially greater burden on illegitimate children cannot be written broadly
to deprive illegitimate children of inheritance rights in situations that do not
promote permissible state interests.34 In Trimble the Court held that the state
of Illinois' interest in preventing fraudulent claims against estates did not justify
depriving all illegitimate children of the right to intestate succession.3 5 In Lall,
inherit from the child without placing the same burden on the illegitimate child's mother and mater-
nal heirs. Id.
30. Stern, 66 N.C. App. at 511-12, 311 S.E.2d at 911-12. In fact the court questioned whether
a statute classifying the parents of an illegitimate should not be subject to a less stringent equal
protection review. Id. at 511, 311 S.E.2d at 911.
31. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
32. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
33. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 766-67 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164,
172 (1972)). Statutes affecting illegitimate children are given an intermediate equal protection re-
view. See Stern, 66 N.C. App. at 511, 311 S.E. 2d at 911; Note, supra note 6, at 207; Note, Trimble
v. Gordon: Expanding the Illegitimate's Right to Inherit, 32 ARK. L. Rnv. 120, 121-22 (1979). A
court may require a more careful balancing between the rights of a class entitled to intermediate
review, such as illegitimate children, and permissible state interests than is required under the nor-
mal rational basis standard. Id. at 125-26; see infra note 34 and accompanying text. The Court in
Trimble rejected the argument that illegitimate children are a suspect class entitled to the highest
level of equal protection review. 430 U.S. at 767. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,
82 HARv. L. Rav. 1065, 1101-03, 1121-22 (1969).
The equal protection review for illegitimate children is not limited to intestate succession rights.
See, eg., Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (discussing eligibility of illegiti-
mate children to receive deceased parent's workers' compensation benefits).
34. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 772. The Court stated:
We think. . . that the Illinois Supreme Court gave inadequate consideration to the rela-
tion between [the statute] and the state's proper objective of assuring accuracy and effi.
ciency in the disposition of property at death. The Court failed to consider the possibility
of a middle ground between the extremes of complete exclusion and case-by-case determi-
nation of paternity.
Id. at 770-71. Both Trimble and Lalli quoted with approval the Court's statement in Matthew v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976), that the statute must not "'broadly discriminate between legiti-
mates and illegitimates without more, [and must be] carefully tuned to alternative considerations.'"
Trimble, 430 U.S. at 772; Lalli, 439 U.S. at 266. Professor Loewy suggests that in order to sustain a
statute affecting illegitimates, a state must show a "legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose sufficient to
render it probable that the discrimination was merely an incidental adjunct to a legitimate purpose."
Loewy, A Different and More Viable Theory of Equal Protection, 57 N.C.L. REv. 1, 22 (1978).
35. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771-72. An illegitimate child in Illinois could only inherit if she was
subsequently legitimated by the marriage of her parents. Id. The Court noted that the state interest
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however, a New York statute allowing inheritance by illegitimate children from
their fathers only after a judicial declaration of paternity was obtained was held
to be sufficiently related to the state's proper interest in avoiding spurious claims
against estates.36
In Mitchell v. Frueler37 the North Carolina Supreme Court, relying on
Trimble and Lalli, held that section 29-19 passed equal protection scrutiny. 38
Specifically, the court found section 29-19 constitutional because it had a legiti-
mate purpose and provided more ways for an illegitimate child to establish pa-
ternity than the New York statute upheld in Lalli.
3 9
The dissent did not quarrel with the majority's characterization of section
29-19 as constitutional on its face.4° Instead, Judge Johnson noted the United
States Supreme Court's partial reliance on the New York courts' liberal judicial
construction of the New York statute in holding the statute constitutional. 41 He
contrasted this treatment with the North Carolina Supreme Court's strict con-
struction of section 29-19 in Stern42 and suggested that section 29-19(b) be
interpreted broadly to allow substantial compliance with its provisions. He con-
cluded that the court's failure to do so violated the equal protection rights of
Edward Stem's heirs. 43
Judge Johnson argued further that even if the statute did not violate the
equal protection clause, plaintiffs should have been allowed recovery based on
decedent's father's constructive compliance with section 29-19.44 He pointed to
in legitimate family relations is not served by totally depriving illegitimate children of their inheri-
tance rights because their parents failed to marry. Id. at 770. See also Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1975).
36. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 275. According to one commentator, Trimble
reflects the philosophy that a limited amount of discrimination against illegitimates is al-
lowable in the formulation of state laws regarding the orderly disposition of property upon
death, but laws which make it virtually impossible for an illegitimate child to be made
legitimate, and thereby eligible to inherit from his biological father, are an unconstitutional
denial of equal protection: of the laws under the fourteenth amendment.
Note, Davis v. Jones: A Case for Equitable Legitimation, 23 S. TEx. L.J. 250, 252-53 (1982).
37. 297 N.C. 206, 254 S.E.2d 762 (1979).
38. Mitchell, 297 N.C. at 216, 254 S.E.2d at 762. See 3 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY
LAW § 252, at 361 (4th ed. 1981).
39. Mitchell, 297 N.C. at 216, 254 S.E.2d at762.
40. Stern, 66 N.C. App. at 512, 311 S.E.2d at 911-12 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 520-21, 311 S.E.2d at 916-17 (Johnson, J., dissenting). The New York court's liberal
construction of the statute advanced the statute's remedial goal of equalizing inheritance rights for
illegitimate children. Id.
42. Id. (Johnson, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 521-22, 311 S.E.2d at 917 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
44. The doctrine of constructive compliance allows a party who acts consistently with the pur-
poses of a statute, but fails to comply with a technical requirement, to benefit from the protection of
the statute. See Note, supra note 6, at 216. The North Carolina courts have accepted the rule that
statutes serving a remedial purpose are to be construed liberally to achieve their objectives. See
Joyner v. Lucas, 42 N.C. App. 541, 546, 257 S.E.2d 105, 108 (1979) (civil paternity action under
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-14). In contrast to other states, see, e.g., Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d
892, 894-95 (Minn. 1978), North Carolina courts have not applied this principle to § 29-19. See
Stern, 66 N.C. App. at 510-11, 311 S.E.2d at 911 (§ 29-19 language is unambiguous).
In the absence of legislative history, one can only wonder whether the general assembly ex-
pected the requirements of § 29-19 to be strictly construed. The statute's provision for voluntary
acknowledgement of paternity, however, see supra note 17 and accompanying text, suggests that the
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the trial court's findings of fact to show that there was little chance that the
Stern plaintiffs' claim was spurious. First, Edward Stem was clearly the biologi-
cal father. Second, the decedent and- his father lived together for the first eight-
een years of decedent's life and always treated each other as father and son.
Third, decedent adopted his father's surname and was closer to his father's rela-
tives than to his mother's. Last, most of the disputed estate was inherited by the
decedent from his father's estate one year before the lawsuit was commenced. 45
Judge Johnson stated that the majority should have addressed
the issue of statutory construction . . . whether a father's acknowl-
edgement of paternity in his duly probated last will is the substantial
equivalent of an inter vivos acknowledgement of paternity in a written
instrument executed or acknowledged [in compliance with section 29-
19(b)(2)]. 46
Although the outcome advocated by Judge Johnson is appealing, his equal
protection reasoning is not entirely sound. Consideration of New York's "lib-
eral" statutory construction in Laii4 7 does not necessarily lead to the conclu-
sion that section 29-19(b) as applied in Stern is insufficiently related to the state
interest of preventing fraud upon estates so as to deny equal protection to the
paternal heirs of an illegitimate child.4 8 The father's recognition of his child in
his duly probated last will is more remote from statutory requirements than the
exceptions made by the New York courts for technical noncompliance with New
York's statutory provisions. 49 For example, a New York trial court recognized
as proof of paternity a judicial support order that did not specifically mention
paternity5 0 and allowed a paternity proceeding that was commenced, but not
terminated, before the father's death to constitute compliance with the statute's
requirement that paternity be established during the father's lifetime.5 1 Further,
the Court in Lalli was aware that statutory procedures intended to promote the
state's interest in disposition of estates would cause some inequitable results:
We do not question that there will be some illegitimate children
who would be able to establish their relationship to their deceased fa-
ther without serious disruption of the administration of estates and
that, as applied to such individuals [the statute] appears to operate un-
fairly.. .. Our inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause does not
focus on the abstract "fairness" of a state law, but on whether the stat-
ute's relation to the state interest it is intended to promote is so tenu-
general assembly expected the standard to cover even the estates of putative fathers who appeared to
have lived with or supported their children. Stern, 66 N.C. App. at 513, 311 S.E.2d at 912 (Johnson,
J., dissenting).
45. Stem, 66 N.C. App. at 513-14, 311 S.E.2d at 912-13 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 515, 311 S.E.2d at 913-14 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Although a will does not techni-
cally meet the requirements of subsection (b) as a written, signed, and acknowledged recognition of
paternity, it certainly falls within the spirit of subsection (b). See supra note 1.
47. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
48. See supra note 33.
49. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 273-74.
50. Id. at 274. See In re Kennedy, 89 Misc. 2d 551, 392 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1977).
51. Laffl, 439 U.S. at 274. See In re Niles, 53 A.D.2d 983, 385 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1976), appeal
denied sub nom. Niles v. Beninati, 40 N.Y.2d 809, 360 N.E.2d 1109, 392 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1977).
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ous that it lacks the rationality contemplated by the fourteenth
amendment.5 2
Thus, it appears that even without the liberal construction of Judge Johnson
section 29-19(b) as construed by the majority does not run afoul of the equal
protection clause.
Judge Johnson's second contention, that constructive compliance with sec-
tion 29-19(b) was present in Stern, is a more promising argument for plaintiffs.
The court of appeals held in Herndon v. Robinson 53 that an illegitimate child's
proof that his father had paid for his birth, had taken out insurance policies on
him, and had listed him as a son on an employment application did not "rise to
the dignity of constructive compliance" with section 29-19(b).5 4 That construc-
tive compliance was even recognized, however, suggests that the doctrine would
be accepted under the right facts.55 The Herndon court's conclusion that the
father's acknowledgment of paternity did not show intent to allow the child to
inherit was crucial to its analysis.
The formalities [of section 29-19(b)]. . . assure that the decedent in-
tended the illegitimate child to share in the estate, much in the same
way a father intentionally excludes legitimate children as beneficiaries
under his will. But, just as the father must act to exclude a legitimate
child from sharing in his estate, he must also act to include an illegiti-
mate child.5
6
In Stern, however, Edward Stern had acted to include his son in the will. Plain-
tiffs had both the father's acknowledgment of paternity in the will and a direct
bequest of his entire estate to his son. Thus, a finding of constructive compliance
on the facts in Stern would have been consistent with the purpose of section 29-
19(b) as expressed in Herndon.
Judge Johnson suggested that the North Carolina courts recognize inher-
itance rights under section 29-19 whenever achievement of the remedial pur-
poses of the statute could be enhanced without undermining the state's interest
in preventing fraudulent claims.57 While this solution would erode the predict-
ability of the statute, it would lead to fairer results. The harsh result in Stern
and, more disturbingly, in cases such as Herndon in which an illegitimate child
is deprived of his share in his father's estate suggests that section 29-19 as cur-
rently interpreted fails to achieve its egalitarian goals. An approach to intestate
succession that balances the interests of illegitimate children and the state would
reduce the instances in which illegitimate children are unjustly deprived of their
inheritance and would not unduly burden estates with fraudulent claims.
52. LaIli, 439 U.S. at 272-73.
53. 57 N.C. App. 318, 291 S.E.2d 305, cert. denied, 306 N.C. 557, 294 S.E.2d 223 (1982).
54. Id. at 321, 291 S.E.2d at 307.
55. Stern, 66 N.C. App. at 514, 311 S.E.2d at 914-15 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
56. Herndon, 57 N.C. App. at 320-21, 291 S.E.2d at 307. The weakness in this reasoning is
obvious. A decedent cannot exclude any of his legal heirs when he dies intestate. Thus, the question
is not whether decedent intended for his illegitimate child to inherit, but whether the child is recog-
nized as a legal heir. See, Note, Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law: Property, 61 N.C.L.
REV. 1171, 1212 (1983).
57. Stern, 66 N.C. App. at 516, 311 S.E.2d at 914 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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Many state legislatures have recognized that statutes, which are constitu-
tional under Trimble and Lalli do not adequately protect the inheritance rights
of illegitimate children and thus have enacted more flexible statutes. Some of
the most protective statutes allow an illegitimate child to take by intestate suc-
cession if her father "openly and notoriously" recognized her5 8 or if a "mutually
acknowledged relationship of parent and child" was present.59 Under these stat-
utes, the state's interest in the orderly disposition of estates is subordinated to
provide inheritance to "the informally acknowledged child." 6° In New Mex-
ico 61 and Massachusetts62 paternity may be established in an intestate succes-
sion proceeding by a preponderance of the evidence. Under this approach, a
father's acknowledgement of his child is strong evidence of paternity, but is not
required for inheritance. 63 This inheritance scheme reaches both informally ac-
knowledged children and illegitimate children who would have been able to es-
tablish paternity only in an adversary proceeding during their father's lifetime.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted its statute" to allow a paternity
58. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.222 (West 1963); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-501 (1976) (notori-
ous recognition sufficient to establish paternity for intestate succession); see also Hawk's Estate v.
Lain, 329 N.W.2d 660 (Iowa 1983) (in the absence of blood tests, testimony of mother and photo-
graphs of father and child together were sufficient to find paternity by a preponderance of the evi-
dence); In re Wolf's Estate, 242 Iowa 1012, 48 N.W.2d 890 (1951) (testimony that it was common
knowledge that decedent was the father and that decedent had admitted he was father supported a
finding of paternity); Kuhn v. Hicks, 229 Kan. 536, 626 P.2d 794 (1981) (clearly identified voluntary
child support constitutes recognition).
59. See MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(4)(c) (West 1982). In In re Vellenga, 120 Mich.
App. 699, 702, 327 N.W.2d 340, 342 (1982), the Michigan Court of Appeals held that because an
unborn child could not acknowledge her father she was unable to take intestate from him when he
died before her birth. For an annotation critical of this result, see In re Vellenga: An HeirAppar-
ently Not, 1984 DET. L. Rnv. 829 (1984).
60. The failure of the revised Louisiana statute to provide for the "informally acknowledged
child" is discussed at length in Note, A Survey of Recent Changes in Intestate Succession Law Affect-
ing Illegitimate Children-The Informally Acknowledged Child Is the Ultimate Loser, 29 Loy. L.
REV. 323 (1983).
As Justice Brennan pointed out in Lalli, the child who is recognized and supported by his father
is unlikely to have filed a paternity suit and thus will be unable to inherit under any statute that, like
North Carolina's, requires recognition in a criminal or civil proceeding or entry with a clerk of
court. See Lai, 439 U.S. at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This creates the bizarre result that a
father who recognizes and even lives with his illegitimate child will have none of his estate go to the
child, while a father who is compelled by the courts to support his child will have his estate shared
by the child. One commentator is particularly concerned about the offspring of the growing number
of cohabitation relationships who become victims of society's preference for legitimate relationslips,
even though they were never denied the father's presence or support during his life. See Note, supra
note 6, at 216-17. Thus, the state's permissible interest in preventing fraud upon estates causes the
impermissible result of punishing children for their parents' choice not to marry. See supra note 35.
61. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-109(B)(3) (1978).
62. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190, § 7 (West 1981).
63. Despite testimony of "lack of communication between decedent and [son] over a period of
36 years," the New Mexico trial court found paternity established. In re Estate of Padilla, 97 N.M.
508, 512, 641 P.2d 539, 543 (1982). Decedent's acknowledgement to mother, pediatrician, and
friend; and grandmother's testimony that decedent visited child, met the "stricter" standard for
illegitimate child's inheritance from father. Higgins v. Ripley, 16 Mass, App. 928, 928, 450 N.E.2d
186, 186 (1983).
64. MIN. STAT. ANN. § 525.172 (West 1975) provides:
An illegitimate child shall inherit from his mother the same as if born in lawful wedlock,
and also from the person who... shall have declared himself to be his father... or from
the person who has been determined to be the father of such child in a paternity proceeding
before a court of competent jurisdiction ....
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proceeding for intestate succession after a father's death. The court found these
proceedings necessary for full protection of illegitimate children despite the
state's interest in facilitating disposition of estates:
[W]e recognize the legitimate concern that has been expressed in some
of the cases from other jurisdictions about the risk of fraudulent claims
against the putative father's estate. However, this risk is not signifi-
cantly greater in paternity actions brought after the putative father's
death than in many other types of actions, including an action by a
party seeking to prove that he is the legitimate child of a decedent.
Most importantly, we believe that the risk is outweighed by the injus-
tice which is done to the innocent child by denying it an adjudication
of paternity simply because its putative father happened to die.65
The Illinois legislature has made statutes allowing an adjudication of paternity
after the father's death more acceptable to states concerned about fraud by giv-
ing plaintiffs a burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.66
Despite the advantages of such legislative reform in improving the fairness
of inheritance laws, however, the North Carolina General Assembly is unlikely
to adopt an approach that balances the equation strongly in favor of the inheri-
tance rights of illegitimate children.67 It is worthwhile, therefore, to propose
those changes most vital to the needs of illegitimate children which might rea-
sonably be expected to be added to the paternal acknowledgement provisions of
section 29-19(b) in the near future.
The rights of illegitimate minors who are entitled to their fathers' support
must be afforded greater protection. Children under eighteen should be granted
a one year grace period from the date of their father's death to establish pater-
nity.68 This amendment would benefit both informally acknowledged children
and those who had not been supported by their father. In addition, an illegiti-
The statute does not specify whether the proceeding must take place before the father's death. Id.;
see Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d 892, 894-95 (Minn. 1978). The North Carolina statute is not
open to judicial interpretation on this point because it refers specifically to paternity proceedings
which must take place during the father's lifetime. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19(b)(1) (1984). See supra
notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
65. Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn. 1978). The North Carolina General
Assembly was apparently concerned about preventing claims that would slow the disposition of
estates, a point not addressed by the Minnesota court, and about fraud.
66. Act of June 11, 1975, § 2-2(h), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110112, § 2-2(h) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1984). See also Cody v. Johnson, 92 Ml. App. 3d 208, 415 N.E.2d 1131 (1980) (rejecting argument
that decedent's heirs were deprived of equal protection because they could not introduce blood test
to disprove paternity after the putative father's death).
Justice Brennan's dissent in Lalli suggests that a state's interest in preventing fraud would be
served by a statute requiring "formal public acknowledgements of paternity," or by statutes requir-
ing proof of paternity by "clear and convincing evidence, or even beyond a reasonable doubt." La!I,
439 U.S. at 278-9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
North Carolina requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt for support actions during the father's
lifetime. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-14(b) (1984). Furthermore, it makes no special provisions for infor-
mally acknowledged children, thus carefully safeguarding estates from fraudulent claims. See notes
15-17 and accompanying text.
67. The historical treatment by North Carolina of illegitimate children's inheritance rights sug-
gests this conclusion. For a discussion of the developments of North Carolina law on inheritance for
illegitimate children, see supra notes 6-19 and accompanying text and note 44.
68. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 209 (West Supp. 1984).
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mate minor will benefit from a rebuttable presumption .of paternity if he can
show that the alleged father was known to have lived with the mother at the
time of conception 69 or that the minor lived with the father immediately after
birth.70 Although these changes would reduce the certainty of the disposition of
estates, they are warranted because of the compelling needs of dependent chil-
dren. Further, the inheritance rights of the heirs of a father who acknowledges
and provides for his illegitimate child in his duly probated will should be granted
as they pose no danger of fraudulent claims on the illegitimate child's estate.
Several commentators in addition to Judge Johnson have proposed that the
North Carolina Supreme Court protect further the inheritance rights of illegiti-
mate children by expounding a doctrine of constructive compliance with section
29-19(b). 7 1 A broad theory of constructive compliance would allow intestate
inheritance whenever the child could establish proof of paternity by convincing
evidence. 72 The objective would be to protect illegitimate children whose fa-
thers voluntarily acknowledged their paternity and provided support, but failed
to certify their paternity in strict compliance with section 29-19(b). The effect of
this practice would be to transform the formal requirements of section 29-19(b)
into a looser standard equivalent to "open and notorious recognition. 7 3
An alternative standard for constructive compliance with section 29-19,
more consistent with legislative intent74 but less protective of illegitimate chil-
dren, would be to grant inheritance rights if the illegitimate child's convincing
proof of paternity includes at least one written document tending to establish
acknowledgement of paternal obligation. Unfortunately, this standard would be
more useful to the heirs of the child's father as in Stern, who could rely on a
probated will, than it would be to illegitimate children. The doctrine could be
extended, however, to a child who could show a consistent pattern of support
documented by checks signed by the father to the child's mother or guardian or
by checks for payment of expenses for the household in which the father and
child were living as part of the proof of paternal acknowledgement.
69. Cf. Id., comment (b) ("[p]roof of filiation may include, but is not limited to: 'Informal'
acknowledgement; scientific test results; acknowledgement in a testament; and proof that the alleged
parents lived in a state of concubinage at the time of conception").
70. Note that while this change would help plaintiffs in Stern, it would not affect the result in
Herndon in which the child began living with his father at age nine, but the parents never lived
together. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. These presumptions follow from the assump-
tion of the public generally that the man living with the mother or supporting the infant is its father.
71. See Note, supra note 56, at 1211 (1983); Note, supra note 6, at 211-12.
72. Such an approach would have compelled the North Carolina Court of Appeals to rule
differently in both Stern and Herndon. In both Stern and Herndon the father openly acknowledged
his paternity and had the child live with him and take his name. See supra notes 20 & 54 and
accompanying text. On these facts the court would have found constructive compliance. If the
North Carolina Supreme Court had been presented with this argument in Mitchell v. Freuler, 297
N.C. 206, 207, 254 S.E.2d 762, 762 (1979), it would have been required to recognize constructive
compliance because decedent lived with his son for the final seven years of the decedent's life, took
out insurance policies in his son's name, and openly acknowledged his paterpity. In each of these
cases, the danger of fraud was not present.
73. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
74. One student commentator has suggested that equitable legitimation, and not constructive
compliance, should be recognized, allowing all possible avenues of proof, such as photographs, let-
ters and testimony, to prove paternal acknowledgement. See Note, supra note 36, at 254-55.
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Though the holding in the Stern case was rather narrow, its implications
are significant. Stern establishes for North Carolina the modest proposition that
the same equal protection and statutory analysis is applicable under section 29-
19(b) whether the plaintiff is an illegitimate child or the heir of an illegitimate
child's father. It also upholds a standard of strict statutory construction of sec-
tion 29-19. The decision's harsh result, however, should alert the North Caro-
lina General Assembly that its concern for prevention of fraudulent claims upon
estates has severely restricted the statute's ability to equalize inheritance rights
between legitimate and illegitimate children and that statutory reform, therefore,
is needed. In particular, the statute should be amended to address the problems
of illegitimate minors not formally recognized by their fathers. Finally, the
North Carolina Supreme Court should recognize the doctrine of constructive
compliance with section 29-19(b) and establish a more flexible and equitable
standard for the lower courts to follow.
DAVID E. WEBB
